{"id":2098,"date":"2026-01-05T10:36:06","date_gmt":"2026-01-05T01:36:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/?p=2098"},"modified":"2026-01-05T10:36:06","modified_gmt":"2026-01-05T01:36:06","slug":"youth-disillusionment-and-political-coping-a-comparative-study-of-china-and-south-korea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/?p=2098","title":{"rendered":"Youth Disillusionment and Political Coping: A Comparative Study of China and South Korea"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"wpb-content-wrapper\"><p>[vc_row][vc_column][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=&#8221;1\/2&#8243;][\/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=&#8221;1\/2&#8243; css=&#8221;.vc_custom_1666059682274{margin-bottom: 20px !important;}&#8221;][vc_acf field_group=&#8221;15&#8243; field_from_15=&#8221;field_634e0b764f542&#8243; show_label=&#8221;yes&#8221; align=&#8221;right&#8221;][\/vc_column_inner][\/vc_row_inner][vc_row_inner][vc_column_inner width=&#8221;1\/4&#8243;][vc_single_image source=&#8221;featured_image&#8221; img_size=&#8221;full&#8221;][vc_btn title=&#8221;\uc6d0\ubb38 \ub2e4\uc6b4\ub85c\ub4dc&#8221; style=&#8221;flat&#8221; color=&#8221;chino&#8221; size=&#8221;sm&#8221; align=&#8221;center&#8221; i_icon_fontawesome=&#8221;fas fa-file-pdf&#8221; button_block=&#8221;true&#8221; add_icon=&#8221;true&#8221; link=&#8221;url:http%3A%2F%2Fasiareview.snu.ac.kr%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2026%2F01%2F12_%EC%9D%BC%EB%B0%98_Xu-Haina-and-Sun-Eae-Chun_4%EA%B5%90.pdf|target:_blank&#8221;][\/vc_column_inner][vc_column_inner width=&#8221;3\/4&#8243;][vc_column_text]<\/p>\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"section\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"section\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<div class=\"page\" title=\"Page 1\">\n<div class=\"section\">\n<div class=\"layoutArea\">\n<div class=\"column\">\n<p style=\"text-align: justify;\">This article compares how youth disillusionment has unfolded in China and South Korea between 2010 and 2025 and explains why coping patterns diverge across these contrasting political contexts. Drawing on stress- coping theory, social movement framing, and political opportunity structures, we conceptualize youth responses as adaptive repertoires that range from passive withdrawal to collective contention. Using existing literature and survey data, we show that shared drivers\u2015slowing growth, precarious employment, entrenched inequality, and intensifying performance pressures\u2015have strained many young people\u2019s confidence in institutions and produced parallel vernaculars of malaise (e.g., t\u01cengp\u00edng \/ \u201clet it rot\u201d and \u201cHell Joseon\u201d). When opportunities for voice are perceived as limited, Chinese youth tend to adopt individualized, low-risk strategies such as quiet quitting, online irony, internal exits, punctuated only occasionally by brief episodes of public expression and met with a combination of narrative steering, selective accommodation, and efforts to preserve social order control. In South Korea\u2019s more pluralistic public arena, similar grievances more readily translate into digitally enabled mobilization, issue-specific protests, and partial institutional uptake, even as polarization (notably along gender lines) and persistent \u201cexit\u201d aspirations endure. The findings illuminate how structure conditions agency and suggest several potential policy priorities: credible pathways to quality jobs and housing, inclusive participation channels, and depolarizing frames that restore a generational stake in the future.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>[\/vc_column_text][vc_separator][vc_acf field_group=&#8221;15&#8243; field_from_15=&#8221;field_668b69583b98c&#8221; show_label=&#8221;yes&#8221; el_class=&#8221;tag&#8221;][vc_column_text css=&#8221;.vc_custom_1767578011481{margin-top: 20px !important;}&#8221;]<a href=\"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/12_\uc77c\ubc18_Xu-Haina-and-Sun-Eae-Chun_4\uad50.pdf\" class=\"pdfemb-viewer\" style=\"\" data-width=\"max\" data-height=\"max\" data-toolbar=\"both\" data-toolbar-fixed=\"on\">12_\uc77c\ubc18_Xu-Haina-and-Sun-Eae-Chun_4\uad50<\/a>[\/vc_column_text][\/vc_column_inner][\/vc_row_inner][\/vc_column][\/vc_row]<\/p>\n<\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This article compares how youth disillusionment has unfolded in China and South Korea between 2010 and 2025 and explains why coping patterns diverge across these contrasting political contexts. Drawing on stress- coping theory, social movement framing, and political opportunity structures, we conceptualize youth responses as adaptive repertoires that range from passive withdrawal to collective contention. Using existing literature and survey data, we show that shared drivers\u2015slowing growth, precarious employment, entrenched inequality, and intensifying performance pressures\u2015have strained many young people\u2019s confidence in institutions and produced parallel vernaculars of malaise (e.g., t\u01cengp\u00edng \/ \u201clet it rot\u201d and \u201cHell Joseon\u201d). When opportunities for voice are perceived as limited, Chinese youth tend to adopt individualized, low-risk strategies such as quiet quitting, online irony, internal exits, punctuated only occasionally by brief episodes of public expression and met with a combination of narrative steering, selective accommodation, and efforts to preserve social order control. In South Korea\u2019s more pluralistic public arena, similar grievances more readily translate into digitally enabled mobilization, issue-specific protests, and partial institutional uptake, even as polarization (notably along gender lines) and persistent \u201cexit\u201d aspirations endure. The findings illuminate how structure conditions agency and suggest several potential policy priorities: credible pathways to quality jobs and housing, inclusive participation channels, and depolarizing frames that restore a generational stake in the future.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":11,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[49,3],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2098","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category--15-3-2025","category-2-"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2098","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2098"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2098\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2099,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2098\/revisions\/2099"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/11"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2098"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2098"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/asiareview.snu.ac.kr\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2098"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}