



East Asian Rivalry, Digital Media and Proximate Enemies in Japan*

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The substantial expansion of global capitalism in the post-cold-war context has accompanied the ascent of Asian economies and (commercialized) cultures as most exemplified by China and South Korea. In contrast, Japan's experience has been marked by the struggle with economic slump after the collapse of so-called bubble economy. Accordingly we have observed the intensification of economic and cultural rivalry between Japan, China and South Korea, joined together with political contestation over historical issues. This paper discuss the rise of anti-Chinese and Korean sentiment in Japan, which also generates hate-speech movement against resident Koreans. It will be argued that growing East Asian rivalry with the relative decline of Japan, the vague sense of socio-economic frustration and the upsurge of digital media communication have been complicatedly conjoined to engender the attack and hunt of proximate enemies as the object of expression of dislike.

Keywords Proximate enemies, East Asian rivalry, nationalism, jingoism, hate speech, Japan's shrinking economy, digital media

I. Introduction

The substantial expansion of global capitalism in the post-cold-war context has accompanied the ascent of East Asian economies, while Japan's experience has been marked by the struggle with economic slump after the collapse of so-called bubble economy. Contrastively Japan's cultural power has been growing as Japanese media culture has become internationally received favorably, but the advent of capitalism and the expansion of cultural markets have enhanced the production capacity of other Asian countries too and South Korean counterparts even surpass Japan. Accordingly we have observed the intensification of economic and

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cultural rivalry between Japan, China and South Korea and the rise of inter-Asian antagonism and othering, joined together with political contestation over historical issues. This paper discuss how, while the activation of regional circulation and consumption of media cultures has considerably advanced East Asian cultural exchange since mid-1990s, the rise of anti-Chinese and Korean sentiment in Japan, which also generates hate-speech movement against resident Koreans, overwhelm, if not suppress, East Asian cultural exchange. It will be argued that growing East Asian rivalry with the relative decline of Japan, the vague sense of socio-economic frustration and the upsurge of digital media communication have been complicatedly conjoined to engender the attack and hunt of proximate enemies as the object of expression of dislike.

II. Intensifying antagonism with China and South Korea

Since the mid 1990s, in addition to recession, Japanese economy has been confronting a serious domestic issue of the aging and shrinking population and substantial reduction of workforces in the decades to come. This has accompanied various kinds of socio-economic anxiety, contradiction and discordance—such as a widening gap between the haves and the have-nots, and the increasing sense of insecurity regarding full-time employment and the gloomy prospects of the maintenance of social welfare system and a public pension plan. In this situation, the hitherto claim of cultural distinctiveness and superiority derived from economic power as exemplified by *nihonjinron* discourse (Iwabuchi, 1994) passed away. Instead, there have emerged various forms of nationalistic discourses and actions to (re)discover the excellence of the nation (see Abe, 2001; Yoda, 2000). One of the most prominent attempts was the substantial revision of history textbooks to counter the “self-torturing” view of Japan’s modern history of imperialism and colonialism in Asian regions. The right-wing revisionist group Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform insisted on the necessity of rejecting a self-torturing historical view had long been disseminated by leftist intellectuals and mass media to regain the sense of pride of being Japanese. While the post-Cold War era has witnessed many expressions of hitherto suppressed “memory wars” in many parts of the

world (Huyssen, 2003), a nationalistic reevaluation of Japan's war responsibility over issues such as Yasukuni Shrine, the "comfort women: and Nanjing Massacre predominated in Japan (see Morris-Suzuki, 2005). The most eminent work was a comic book titled *Sensouron* (on war) (1998) written by one of the members of the group Kobayashi Yoshinori. Rejecting a "self-torturing" historical view of Japan's war of aggression over Asian countries, the book stresses the importance of fostering the memory about patriotic soldiers who fought and died to protect their families and Asian populace from Western imperial power. While the book much attracted criticism for its unreasonable justification of the Greater East Asian War, it was well received and has had a great influence on the historical perception of populace, especially among younger generations, and the rise of cyber right-wingers and jingoistic movements, as I will discuss later.

In the twenty-first century, nationalistic sentiments have become more diffused and taken an aggressive turn. One significant cause for this is the growing economic and cultural power of China and South Korea, which led to the exacerbation of Japan's antagonistic relationship with them over above-mentioned unresolved historical issues and territorial disputes over Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands with China and Dokdo/Takeshima with South Korea. Leaders of three countries politically adopt a hard line over the issues to attract the support from populace. Especially then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's (2001-2006) persistent visit to Yasukuni Shrine made Japan's relationship with China and South Korea more adversarial and caused the rise of anti-Japan demonstrations in the countries. The situation further aggravated in 2012. Then South Korean President Li Myung-bak's visit to Dokdo to publicly announce Korea's unambiguous ownership of the island further escalated nationalistic sentiments in Korea and Japan. And in December 2012, Liberal Democratic Party regained power in Japan and a conservative government was formed under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, which shows a stronger stance against the historical and territorial disputes with China and South Korea. And in March 2013, Park Geun-hye was elected as President of South Korea, who also took a strong stance towards historical issues. The further heat-up of the dispute with China and South Korea had given further momentum of anti-China and Korea expressions in Japan.

Here has been occurring a vicious circle of inter-East-Asian nationalism

and jingoism. In this period, various kinds of anti-Korea and anti-China books and journal articles published and put in the front corner of major bookshops and publishers much advertise the books in trains, train stations and newspapers. More than 200 “hate-books” (*beitobon*) against Korea, resident Koreans and China had been published from 2103-2014 and as editors of hate-books confessed they published the books only for the purpose of hitting the niche market in which people’s sense of being depressed can be shaken off. Public opinion surveys conducted by the government every year clearly showed the sharp decline of the sense of intimacy that people in Japan feel towards China and South Korea in the above period . The percentage of the respondent who feels the sense of intimacy to South Korea declined from 62% to 39% between 2011 and 2012. And that to China sharply declined in 2004 and 2010 due to anti-Japan movements and the heat-up of the dispute over the territorial ownership of Senkaku Island. According to the latest survey conducted in January 2016, only 14% of respondents feel the sense of intimacy to China and 33% to South Korea.

It can be argued that a worsening international relations due to the rise of China and South Korea coincides with a relative decline of the significance of “Western others,” (especially the U.S.) which has long been playing the key role in the construction of Japanese, and most non-Western countries’, national identity. And the decline of its economic power and the relative rise of other Asian economies devastated Japan’s special status as the only highly industrialized non-Western country that Japan had long enjoyed. According to the above survey, the number of people who feel the sense of intimacy to the U.S. has been recently increasing and the latest result showed the highest percentage of 84%, while Japan’s international relationship with China became worsened. This might imply the collective desire for the recuperation of the U.S. power umbrella under which Japan could safely indulge itself in the pursuit of economic development without facing lingering historical disputes with other Asian countries.

III. China's economic power and Japan's oriental orientalism

It should be noted that the rise of antipathy to China and South Korea is rather contrastive to the development of trans-Asian media culture connections that we also have observed since 1990s. As for the perception of China, a relatively good image prevailed in the above-mentioned opinion survey until 2003 when the massive anti-Japanese movement occurred. While Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 somewhat dampened the positive images that people in Japan had, more than a half of people responded that they had a sense of intimacy to China throughout 1990s. China has long been a significant imaginative geography for Japan. It evokes the senses of desire, yearning, respect, comradeship as well as enigma, disdain, fear and hostility, due to its unambiguous dominance and cultural influences in the pre-modern era, the subjection and resistance to European and Japanese imperialism, and postwar communist revitalization and the drastic shift to capitalist market system. In addition to its rich history, its massive scale of land, population and diversity confers on China a special status of cultural entity with full of promising but not-yet-fulfilled potentials, which looks like the land of chimera in the eyes of people of a neighboring country. This was especially the case since the 1990s when, with a spectacular development of capitalist economy, China came to signify a capitalist Asian dreamworld (Iwabuchi, 2002). Its huge market has been captivating the entrepreneur of advanced countries who dream of making profits in the last gold mine of the world. In the field of media culture too, China has attracted many corporations, creators, and audiences all over the world at least since early 1990s. Setting up local offices and employed local staffs, Japanese music industries and talent agencies were actively trying to find and manufacture pan-Asian pop idols by conducting auditions in Beijing and Shanghai. The possibility of co-producing a pan-Asian pop culture with the Japanese initiative underlay a strong predisposition of Japanese media and cultural industries to enter the Chinese media market .

However, in the 1990s there was something more than a mere attraction to the quantity of the market and the manifestation of overdetermined imperial desire in their attempts to enter the Chinese cultural market.

They were no less propelled by a sheer interest in communicating with geographically proximate but emotionally distant Asian neighbor through media and popular culture as a common ground. Intra-regional media and popular cultural connections in East Asia gave a new opportunity for Japan to encounter and work together with (nearly) equally modernized cultural neighbors. Some were fascinated with radical possibilities of Chinese cultural expressions about social agony, contradictions and contestations in a dazzlingly modernizing society. Prominent artists and directors such as Zhang Yimou and Cui Jian were the favorable representative for those people in Japan. In the course of rapid economic development especially after the Tiananmen Square incident, widening gaps between the haves and have-nots, and the urban and the rural as well as apparent contradictions between freedom and control, and between capitalism and socialism became far-reaching. Some alternative cultural expressions and imaginations, it was expected, would be produced out of the unprecedented socio-economic upheaval. Dreaming of what one could no longer pursue or had forgotten in the Japanese context, no small number of producers, critics, journalists, academics and audiences in Japan were keen not just to encouragingly witness but also to join and support the production process of new cultural expressions (see Iwabuchi, 2002).

All of these socio-historically articulated desires for “China” in the 1990s had not been fruitfully fulfilled, if not fully unsuccessful, hence it being Japan’s chimera. However, perhaps except the attraction of the size of the market, they seem to have declined and instead taken contrastive shapes of desire in the new socio-historical context of the first decade of the 21st century. On the one hand, we have witnessed that inter-regional media culture traffic has become even more active and multi-directional in East Asia. Mutual consumption, co-production and co-promotion are becoming more and more common among Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. China is also involved in this ever-activating regional cultural traffic as it receives many media cultures from other parts of East Asia and co-produce TV dramas, films and pop music, especially with Hong Kong and Taiwan but also with Japan and Korea. China is also deeply and unevenly implicated in the transnational media culture in terms of international division of new cultural labor . Not just for Hollywood but also for Japanese cultural industries such as animation, China is an important part

of its production chains for securing cheap labor. Yet, China's media culture export to other parts of Asia, especially to Japan, is still negligibly small. While the rise of Korean Wave (popularity of Korean media and popular culture) has become most prominent, Hualiu (Chinese Wave) is also observed in Japan, but it means media and popular culture of Taiwan and Hong Kong, not of the Mainland China.

It is impossible to straightforwardly explain why Chinese media and popular culture does not attract the populace in Japan, but it could be argued that unlike Korean and Taiwanese media and popular cultures, audiences and producers in Japan might perceive Chinese counterparts as not yet attaining (no less sophisticated) realm of "our" cultural production. And Japan's chimera in its appreciation of China has been rapidly disappearing, as China becomes a real political, economic and military power, which is perceived as a threat to Japan. What has recently become prominent in the mainstream discourse in Japan is the sense of menace that China is "greedily eating us out". China's ever-lasting high economic growth, which is in a stark contrast to Japan's low or even minus growth, is taking away a top position that Japan has long enjoyed and thus strongly evokes a sense of anxiety of being overwhelmed. This sense is exacerbated by another serious nuisance perceived by people in Japan, namely the rise of fervent nationalism and patriotism in China. Japanese mass media repeatedly reported the violent scenes in which some Chinese demonstrators threw eggs to Japanese Embassy and Japanese restaurants and in which Japanese soccer team was severely jeered by Chinese audiences in the stadium even in its match with other country. The economic and political anxiety is culturally translated into what can be called "copyright orientalism", which is the denunciation of illegal copies of cultural commodities and low quality capacity of cultural production, which is closely associated with the uncivilized and outlaw status of Chinese society. Illegal copying of brand goods and DVDs has been a long-standing issue since the 1990s, which is one of the main reasons why most media and cultural corporations could not make a good profit there. While a strong pressure from the U.S. and the joining in WTO have forced the Chinese government to reduce the public visibility of piracy of DVDs and CDs, especially at the time of Beijing Olympic. This is easily associated with the state of unfairness and disorder of Chinese society. Furthermore, what has become noticeable in

the Japanese discourse is the generalization of “fake culture” to many other aspects of Chinese society. Japanese mass media keenly and repeatedly reported on the replica theme park in China, where there are many “cheap copies” of popular characters such as Mickey Mouse and Doraemon. Since imitation is a necessary step to developing originality, piracy and/or copying can be read as a necessary infrastructure for those markets, in which new cultural imaginations and expressions are developed. Japan did the same thing with American popular cultures in the 50s, 60s and 70s (and even now!). Japanese mass media however tend to mock the poor quality of the copies and to claim the vulgarity of Chinese society, in tandem with the violation of copyright as well as the recent incidents of food contamination of agricultural chemicals and many reports on rudeness and vulgarity of Chinese tourists including binge shopping, which clearly disqualifies China’s entry into a first-rate nation in the world. It seems to be claimed that no matter how much China develops economic and political power, it will be the everlasting coarse nation in cultural and democratic terms. This is quite a different way of meeting China from the one when it was perceived as chimera. One is more apt now to perceive an uncivilized fake culture that eloquently tells about the state of Chinese modernity, whose alterity is disavowed in a frozen-in-time Orientalist manner.

IV. Anti-Korean Wave to hate speech against resident Koreans

Japan’s relationship with South Korea in the new millennium shows another kind of complications. While China’s rising economic, political and military power has even more strongly evoked the sense of threat and repulsion, which is translated into the perception of “cultural savageness”, South Korea’s rising cultural power has evoked the sense of displeasing among some populaces in Japan precisely as cultural exchange between Japan and South Korea has been significantly advanced and Korean Wave has come to be embraced in Japan. The co-hosting of FIFA World Cup in 2002 deeply and widely promoted grassroots exchange between the populace of two countries. This timing nearly coincided with the rise of the Korean Wave in Japan. Following the success of a film *Sbri* in 2000, the

phenomenal popularity of TV drama series, *Winter Sonata* had sparked the Korean Wave boom in Japan in 2003 and 2004. The Korean Wave has further encouraged new kinds of understanding of Korean culture and society, promoted human exchange between the two countries and significantly improved the image of South Korea in this period (see Iwabuchi, 2008). While there have been historical issues and territorial disputes with South Korea (and abduction and nuclear issues with North Korea), media cultural flows have improved the mutual perception, especially among the Japanese populace. The sense of intimacy that people in Japan feel to South Korea according to the above-mentioned survey sharply rose after the decision to co-host the FIFA world cup was made in 1995 and further rose after the popularization of Korean Wave in 2003 and 2004. While it declined in 2005-2006 due to historical dispute, it again rose drastically from 48% to 58% in 2006-2007, a period in which K pop starts entered the Japanese market.

However, what had been observed at the same time is the rise of anti-Korean sentiments. While much encouraging grassroots exchange in an unprecedented way, the event also engendered the sense of anger among some people in Japan who watched the scenes via social media in which people of South Korea were not happy with Japan's victory and pleased to see Japan's defeat at the top 16th (and South Korea went up to semi final). The growing tension over historical and territorial issues further added fuel to the flames as mentioned above and the rise of Korean Wave has also become a target of attack. (2002 is also the year when North Korea's abduction was officially admitted and triggered a strong bashing of North Korea and resident Koreans). In 2005, a hate-Korea book (*Kenkanryu* [Hating Korean Wave]) was published. It has been sold more than several hundred thousand copies. While the book title suggests that it is about anti-Korean-Wave but eventually it has little to do with it. The main content is the bashing of Korea for making an outrageous claim and action over Japan's colonial history. While, as will be discussed shortly, the book has been influential on the hate speech movement in terms of making a shift of the blame of Korea onto resident Koreans in Japan, it also sparks the connection of anti-Korea and anti-Korean-Wave, which led to the mobilization of anti-Korean-Wave demonstration as the widely-held sense of frustration to the rise of South Korean popular culture in Japan joined the worsening political relationship over historical issues.

Triggered by a male actor's negative comment on twitter about the

inflow of Korean media culture that Japanese mass media actively promoted, a large-scale demonstration against Fuji TV, a major commercial TV station in Japan, which demonstrators claimed broadcast too many South Korean TV dramas, were organized in August 2011. Though the demonstration was not directly mobilized over the historical issues, the anti-Korean-Wave demonstration can be considered in line with the rise of jingoistic demonstration on the street. While the regional circulation of Japanese media culture encounters the negative legacy of Japanese colonialism in terms of territorial disputes and historical memories, territorial dispute and historical issues are casting more grave shadow in Japan over the East Asian circulation of media cultures. The demonstration has not been motivated by the sense of threat by foreign cultural invasion as was the case with cultural imperialism discourse but by the sense of antipathy against the flux of media culture that is produced by a country, which demonstrators believe makes an unreasonably offensive attitude to Japan.

In the face of worsening mutual jingoism in East Asia, Murakami Haruki warned in September 2012 that people of those countries were badly drunken by the cheap alcohol of nationalism and that intellectuals and cultural critics of those countries should work hard not to ruin cultural exchanges that three countries have fostered. However, the public presence of Korean Wave has been significantly diminished in Japan. The Japanese mass media subsequently refrained from broadcasting South Korean TV dramas or featuring South Korean pop singers in the programs. This does not mean that people ceased to enjoy media cultures from South Korea. Many people still regularly consume Korean popular culture but it is not easy for them to make it public in the face of rising antagonism with South Korea (and China too, as a fan of EXO confessed how she feels uneasy and painful to know a survey result that more than 80% of people in Japan consider Chinese people are not friendly). How people who positively and self-reflexively consume Korean popular cultures perceive and react to the growing anti-Korean movement in Japan is an intriguing question left unexamined in relation to this trend. Some may be indifferent to it while they continue to consume Korean popular culture; some may stop consuming Korean popular culture to express their dissatisfaction with the anti-Japanese movement in Korea and support the anti-Korean movements in Japan; or some may express

opposition to the jingoistic anti-Korean movement through the Internet or social media and participate in the countermovement against escalating racist attacks on resident Korean communities in Japan. In any case, the vicious circle of East Asian nationalism and jingoism has some impacts on people's consumption of popular culture from other parts of East Asia and the mediated cultural exchange and mutual understanding that has been advanced in East Asia.

V. From cyber-right wingers to hate speech demonstrators

The inter-East-Asian aversion overtly and covertly has mobilized many people in Japan and one of the most devastating ramifications is the generation of aggressive hate speech demonstration against resident Korean people, communities and schools in Japan. According to a governmental survey, there had been 1152 hate speech demonstrations between April 2012 and September 2015. Letting out a stream of racist curse, demonstrators offensively denounced resident Koreans as traitor and thief who fraudulently abuse the special privilege, which they actually do not enjoy at all. The phenomena can be conceived as an extreme manifestation of growing jingoistic sentiments and associated actions that have been observed in many parts of the world. In addition to the growing political antagonism against China and South Korea, there are several socio-historical factors behind the development in Japan such as domestic social and economic predicament, historically constituted long-standing marginalization of resident Koreans in Japan, and the prevalence of digital media communications that triggers cyber right-wing activities.

Antipathy against resident Koreans has been amplified by the view that they unfairly enjoy special privilege such as social welfare and permanent residency while fallaciously blaming Japan's colonial rule over the Korean peninsula and lingering issues such as comfort women. Obviously this has much to do with the rise of above-mentioned historical revisionism and the development of the Internet and social media has played a significant role in disseminating such historical perception. The establishment of a popular Internet forum *Ni-Chan'neru* (2 Channel) in 1999 and its growing popularity has triggered the upsurge of so-called *netto uyoku* (cyber right-wingers) (see e.g.,

Tsuji, 2008; Sakamoto, 2011; Ito, 2015). Based on the survey result of the internet discussion site that was conducted in October 2007, Tsuji (2008) defines *netto uyoku* as those who have the following traits: anti-South Korea and anti-China; support for politicians that honor the Yasukuni Shrine, revision of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and patriotism education in Japanese schools; and actively participating in online discussion about political and social issues. A common salient feature of such people according to Tsuji is that they tend to be male, actively participate in *Ni-Channel* discussion and have a great distrust of leftist-biased mass media. The strong antipathy towards intellectual authority exemplified by mass media and leftist intellectuals and the aspiration to find and dispatch alternative “truths” has been a strong driving force of the rise of cyber right-wingers. This resonates with the historical revisionism movement’s critique of mass media and leftist intellectuals’ self-torment historical perception, but anonymous internet communication made the mode of expression much more offensive, abusive and irrational. And, anti-mass media drive met up with anti-Korea and anti-China sentiments to further vitalize cyber right-wingers’ actions in the new millennium (Ito, 2015). When anti-Korea sentiment was heightened at the time of FIFA World Cup, such feeling was also explicitly expressed against the way Japanese mass media did not report on or concealed negative reactions in South Korea against Japanese team’s performance. And as noted above, this anti-mass media sentiment congregated with the growing antipathy against the Korean Wave in Japan, of which mass media was responsible for the promotion.

The special privilege that resident Koreans allegedly unfairly enjoy has become a significant agenda as it well fits cyber right-wingers’ attack against leftist authority of mass media and intellectuals and their self-claimed role of alternative media activists that debunk authorized fallacies and find out hidden “truths” (Ito, 2015). Particularly influential in this regard is an above-mentioned comic book *Kenkanryu* (2005). Against the trend of the Korean Wave fever in Japan, it negatively illustrates the “truth” of South Korea in terms of the “fallacy” of nationalistic posture against the history of Japanese colonialism. The book shows a clear shift of the blame of Korea onto resident Koreans who were born and have been brought up in Japan as the representative of irrational, ignorant Koreans, whose “distorted” claim of the history of Japanese colonialism is brilliantly debunked by

knowledgeable young Japanese people in the comic book (see Liscutin, 2009). Furthermore the book accuses resident Koreans for unfairly receiving the special welfare privilege. While the author's claim was based on false information circulating on the web (Oizumi et al., 2015), this fact could not stop the attack against resident Koreans but has become a driving force of the hate speech movement. And *netto uyoku* nationalism did not remain within cyberspace. Internet site has been functioning as a significant platform that mobilizes right-wingers to street demonstration with the intensification of anti-China and anti-Korea sentiments. The rise of what is called "Activist Conservatives" (*Kōdō suru bosbu*) such as Zaitokukai (Citizen's League against Special Privilege of Koreans in Japan) urged *netto uyoku* people to join the organization and actively participate in the petition and demonstration to counter foreign residents, resident Koreans as well as leftist intellectuals and mass media (Tsuji, 2009; Ito, 2015). Zaitokukai was established in early 2007 (just after the start of the first Abe Cabinet). Their target includes migrants and foreigners who claim "unreasonable" social benefits from Japan, but the main aim of the group is, as the name clearly suggests, the abolishing of privileges held by *Zainichi* Koreans (people of colonial Korean descent) in Japan. They have organized demonstrations against resident Korean communities and schools in various parts of Japan. In 2009 and 2010, for example, Zaitokukai vandalized a Korean elementary school in Kyoto, calling the children 'cockroaches' and 'spies' (Fackler, 2013). Since 2012, Zaitokukai and other groups have regularly held anti-Korean demonstrations, showing placards that included comments such as "Good or Bad Koreans: Kill Them All" (e.g., Ishibashi, 2013; Johnston, 2013). In 2013 more than three hundred demonstrations were organized in many parts of Japan.

The enlargement of *netto uyoku* that has engendered the rise of hate-speech movement exemplified by Zaitokukai obviously shows key features of digitalized communication to change people from a passive consumer to an active subject. Digital media has a great capacity to democratize one-way communication flow of traditional mass media system by expanding the opportunity to make hitherto marginalized voices expressed and shared in society. Yet, such communicative potential opened up by digital communication is not necessarily progressive, but it also generates regressive and even racist kinds of communication, sharing and solidarity as the recent rise of jingoism against Korea and China and nasty "hate-

speech” demonstration against resident Koreans shows. As mentioned above, many people who participate in hate speech movements found the hidden “historical truth” regarding Japan’s colonial history on the internet that Japan did not do anything wrong to colonies and “comfort women” is a fabrication (e.g., see Yasuda, 2012; Kitahara and Paku, 2014). The access to the Internet urged them to find colleagues who share the views, amplifying the circle of coterie. They tend to just read and share a particular kind of historical views they would like to believe, and most of them stubbornly refuse to attend to or discussing with other views at all. This is reminiscent of what Sunstein (2001) calls echo chambers and group polarization. Digital communication well promotes the sharing of information and opinions with others but it tends to be limited to among intimate circles of a similar outlook on the issue concerned, leading to the generation of bipolarized camps and views without exchange (Sunstein, 2001). This trend has become strengthened as “Exploring the Internet moved from directionless “surfing” to goal-oriented searching” (Zuckermann, 2013: 94). The rise of *netto uyoku* and hate speech movement is an extreme case of how digital communication might urge people to “live in information cocoons” (Sunstein, 2006: 188).

The rise of hate speech movement is also indicative of how digital media affectively and effectively mobilize people in the street. Zaitokukai for example subtly uses social media to disseminate the video of their activities on the street to attract more people who would potentially join and support them. And the use of digital communication and social media does not just virtually connect people with similar values and opinions but eventually engender their participation in actual meeting and group actions in the street beyond cyberspace. As the above-mentioned finding by Tsuji (2008) suggests, cyber right-wingers tended to actively participate in the online discussion and petition but the collective demonstration on the street even more intensify the affective gratification that participants gain as the street demonstration with other fellows gives a stronger sense of satisfaction and achievement (Yasuda, 2012).

VI. Hunt for proximate enemies

To gain the sense of satisfaction from street demonstration one might need

immediate, proximate enemies to be attacked. The shift of attack of Korea onto resident Koreans in Japan, who are considered the representative of Korea, is not unique to the Japanese case. Migrants and diaspora has long been the inverted target of jingoistic assault all over the world as the unambiguous identification of migrants and diaspora with their “home” country has engendered racist attacks against them. We are witnessing all over the world the repeated attack against Muslim people in Euro-American countries. However, unlike Euro-American cases, the Japanese style of jingoism is not directly motivated by the sense of crisis of job insecurity or fear of terrorist attack that migrants or radical groups are assumed to cause. As Higuchi (2014) points out, it is more grounded on Japan’s historically constituted problematic relationship with neighboring countries, especially Korea. After 1952 when Korean people in Japan was deprived of Japanese nationality and citizenship, the status of resident Koreans in Japan has been an unsettled issue and they have been suffering institutional and everyday discrimination in Japan. Higuchi argued that the Japanese government has been dealing with their presence and issues in Japan as a domestic matter but a matter of international relations vis-a-vis South Korean and North Korea, as resident Koreans have been officially regarded as those belonging to Korea, not to Japan. Yet, a picture become more complicated when we consider a difficult question of who are participating in the movement and what motivate them. The hate speech movement is obsessively attacking cultural others who, according to their logic, unfairly claim and enjoy social benefits. In this regard, it should be noted that Zaitokukai’s first major hate-speech demonstration that made them widely known and attract supporters and members was organized in 2009 against the family whose Filipino national father was forced to depart Japan due to illegal long stay and which made a claim for taking a special legal measure for a daughter who were born and has been raised in Japan to remain in Japan. This might have something to do with the diffused sense of victimization among the majority people under Japan’s shrinking economy and the downfall of welfare and employment system, which urged them to restore pride by identifying themselves with a nation-state and attack proximate enemies. The logic appears to be akin to what Maruyama Masao (1964) discusses regarding the wartime social atmosphere as the transfer of the sense of oppression to below. However, in the current situation, the oppressing

force does not generated through the state hierarchy but the globalized capitalism. It is hard for people to clearly perceive the cause and effect of the current predicament and contest against it. Market-driven uneven force of globalized capitalism makes many people feel uncertain about their lives, employment and future and generates growing jingoistic movements against migrants and foreigners in many parts of the world. Especially frustrating to them is those who claim social welfare benefits while they are forced to endure harsh realities without being able to enjoy such benefits. The participants often state that they cannot tolerate those who are only putting on victimhood, as many of us are enduring various kinds of hardships (see Yasuda, 2012; Kitahara and Paku, 2014). It could be argued then that people who join and support hate speech movements feel distressed about their lives and find it relieving to subject such outrageous traitors to a kangaroo court (e.g., Yasuda, 2012).

While it has been pointed out that those who participate in *netto uyoku* and hate-speech movement tend to be men with low income, no full-time job and no partners, the picture is rather more complicated as the participants are not limited to such socio-economically marginalized men. There is no small number of women of various age groups and marital status that join the demonstration against the “fallacy of comfort women” organized by various women’s groups as they feel such claim disgraceful to their grandparents and Japan (see Kitahara and Paku, 2014). Middle class, full time worker and even well to do elite people are also participating in and supporting the activities (Higuchi, 2014; Furukawa, 2013). This indicates that search for proximate enemies should be understood in a larger context in which the growing number of people are turning to such actions in Japan and the permeation of digital media has help people release the dark energy of attacking socially vulnerable people and the pleasure of joining or at least supporting collective demonstration in a highly offensive manner. It shows what can be called “introverted jingoism”, which seeks for enemies to be directly and physically attacked within national borders. Proximate enemies of introverted jingoism are thus not limited to resident Koreans or foreign resident or migrants in Japan. Its target is eventually expanding to Ainu, Okinawa, handicapped people, Hiroshima atomic bomb victims, and even Fukushima people who stress the danger of radioactive contamination and oppose to nuclear power plant, as well as migrants and

asylum seekers. As Yasuda (2015) argues, people who endorse hate speech movement are always searching for someone to attack. Anyone who is considered to have unfairly claimed marginalization and demand social welfare from the state could be a target of introverted jingoism. Hence the aversion to traitors is eventually detached from the love for the nation and takes the shape of a playful hunt.

VII. Beyond the culture of dislike

Anti-China/South Korea and hate speech movements are organized in the name of not forgiving anyone who looks down on Japan and damaging Japan's national interests. However, it is highly questionable if the escalated jingoistic attack at internal proximate enemies and the expression of the sense of aversion to them is really motivated by nationalistic sentiment. Yamazaki (2015) calls such movements "strange nationalism." While strongly attacking "traitors" (such as resident Koreans as well as mass media and leftist intellectuals) to Japan, the Anti-China/South Korea and hate speech movement does not actually seriously think of national interests or national integration. Apparently their activities are detrimental to Japan's national interest as they do much harm on the international reputation on the prevalence of racism in Japan. Neither are they concerned with national integration. As Yamazaki (2015: 12-16) argues, nationalism is at the same time inclusive and exclusive as well as universalistic and particularistic, but the current movements too radically stress the exclusiveness at the cost of national integration and coherence. Hunt for proximate enemies is accompanied by the waning of a narrative that cohere a national imagined community as the state-driven economy nationalism lost momentum and social contradiction, fragmentation and diversification within the nation eventually came to the fore. The sole purpose seems to be the discovery and attack of enemies who supposedly damaged and condemned Japan, even if they might claim they are doing a right thing for the sake of the nation.

As Tokyo Olympic 2020 is approaching, the Japanese government is, though belatedly, becoming more restrictive to it as the hate speech movement is highly destructive to the international reputation of Japanese

society. Here the hate speech movement exceeds the level of tolerance of the government as it clearly damages national interests. In April 2016, two parties in power submitted a plan to restrict hate speech. While this is a significant advancement in the Japanese context, legislation is not enough to make jingoistic sentiments and its introverted projection disappear as they are deeply motivated by socially constructed sense of frustration and anxiety and the sense of gratification that traitor hunt gives. Actually the previous head of Zaitokukai ran for the Governor of Tokyo Metropolitan Government in August 2016 and repeated racist attack against resident Koreans in his campaign speech, which the regulation could not have any power to prevent. Furthermore, no penalization of hate-speech was included and thus many strongly doubt how such legislation would be effective. More fundamentally, we need to remember that despite repeated warning from the United Nation about the issues of racism in Japan, there has not yet been any substantial governmental action to legislate anti-racism law with penalty. In relation to this, what should be noted is the Japanese government's unwillingness to develop any policy measure to take care of multicultural situations and migration (see Iwabuchi, 2015). Thus serious un-engagement with multicultural situations makes a politically endorsed social atmosphere that allows the expression of the sense of aversion to migrants and ethnic minorities living in Japan.

It should be noted that active anti-hate speech coalitions have been the driving force of anti-hate speech legislation. Many people in Japan take very seriously how hate speech movement, irrespective of its real motive and aim, have been hurting resident Koreans living in Japan and the movement newly and progressively highlight the issue of ethnic diversity in Japan beyond the discussion of the intake of useful migrant labors for the rehabilitation of Japan's shrinking economy. There have emerged many counter-movements by citizens, groups and activists to stop hate speech and put a pressure on the government to legislate anti-hate-speech law. Many people got together on street to counter hate speech demonstrations and there are many sites and voices that denounce them on the Internet as well as print publications. Internet sites have been set up to call for alliance against hate speech (e.g., *norikoenet*). And the lingering hate-speech movement belatedly let some of mass media report on the issue in more critical manners. Court also made a severe judgment against the act of hate

speech and ordered Zaitokukai to pay huge amount of compensation for damage caused by it. Consequently, the number of hate speech movements has been slightly declining. And some local governments such as Osaka and Kawasaki where many resident Koreans and foreign nationals are living started being engaged with anti-hate-speech by newly developing multicultural co-living initiative to include human right issues. The current situation displays how the politically and historically charged international relations overpower cultural exchange. The rise of hunt for proximate enemies might be if partly motivated by the sense of uncertainty and deprived-ness that the violent advancement of global capitalism causes, but the latter has also significantly engendered new kinds of cultural expressions and mediated regional exchange (Iwabuchi, 2002). It is required to consider how already existing cross-border dialogue can be put in foreground in a way to counter futile jingoism. This is not to positively reevaluate the permeation of global capitalism in East Asia but to tactically implode it by taking its unintended positive consequences more seriously.

A most tough obstacle to achieve it is the difficulty of facilitating dialogue in society where the Internet and social media play a fundamental function of public communication in a way to make people not listen to the ideas and opinions, which they do not agree with or like. It has been much discussed how internet trolling has become a significant issue as internet and social media amplify the culture of dislike or hate as many people virtually and anonymously attacks those who express views or ideas that they do not agree and tolerate (Stein, 2016). But no less problematic in the cases of Japan is passive trollers, those who actually endorse the collective sense of dislike to proximate enemies without actively participating in actual demonstrations and trolls. In Yasuda's (2012) interview regarding the hate speech attack organized by Zaitokukai, a resident Korean expressed his wish that he really would like to have a conversation with them, since they are both living in the same society, though his wish has never come true. At the same time, he said that in a sense Zaitokukai people are easier to understand as they clearly show their voices and appearances, but even more threatening to him is those who quietly and invisibly click and tweet to endorse hate speech movements in Japan. "It is really scary when considering millions of people are invisibly and implicitly supporting the movement." The silent clicking majority would not join the

movement or write comments on the Internet, but they might often visit the sites and click “like” to endorse such views (and read hate-books as well as put negative responses to surveys). Apparently, such actions are complicit with active internet trollers in generating the various kinds of dislike and hate in Japan—to China and South Korea, to Korean Wave, to foreigners in Japan, to mass media and leftist intellectual, to resident Koreans and to anyone who pretend to be victims to unfairly get social benefits. The culture of dislike will not fade given that Japan will need to accept more migrant workers and Japanese economy will continue to shrink. How to reach and talk to the silent clicking majority who are invisible and do not clearly express their sense of frustration and how to shift the focus of the culture of digital communication from expression of like or dislike to listen and dialogue are vital challenge.

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